The consequences of Syria’s stunning power transition in December 2024 extended beyond regional issues; Riyadh also had to rearrange its objectives.
The nation that had led the charge to reintegrate Damascus into the Arab world in 2023 was faced with a new challenge after Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell: How to maintain diplomatic ties with Syria as it enters a rapidly evolving transitional phase without jeopardising its borders, security, and economic interests?
Consequently, Saudi-Syrian relations have shifted from a framework of “cautious normalisation” with the previous regime to a pragmatism that redefines the relationship with the new Syrian authorities. This entails challenging issues like rebuilding, fighting Captagon networks, resettling refugees, and maintaining the unstable regional power balance.
Saudi-Syrian Relations: From a Prolonged Distance to Post-Fall Estimates
A significant turning point in Saudi-Syrian ties had occurred in 2023, before the “day after” in Damascus. In a sign of regional acceptance of the rationale of “neutralising differences” and establishing realistic avenues for humanitarian and security matters, the Arab League gave Syria its seat back. Former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad attended the Jeddah summit for the first time since 2011.
The process ended in late 2024 when the previous government collapsed and the country entered a new era after a series of small steps that raised the degree of official communication. This included the reopening of diplomatic missions and the beginning of reciprocal visits.
From Assad-Normalisation to Transitional Authority Pragmatism
The turning point came on December 8, 2024, when armed opposition groups with regional backing stormed into Damascus following a swift push in the city’s north and centre. Within days, the regime fell, and Assad was no longer involved. Although Riyadh changed its designation from former president to transitional leadership, it proceeded at a steady pace and kept its existing network of relationships.
A “constitutional declaration,” detailing the guidelines for a five-year transitional administration, came out in March, and high-level discussions and visits took place in early 2025. The Saudi foreign minister also returned to Damascus to confer with individuals in charge of the next phase. Eventually, the phrase “normalisation with a besieged regime” gave way to “accompanying a transition that seeks domestic and regional legitimacy,” with a Saudi focus on stability.
Security First: Captagon, Borders, & the Risk Map
The Captagon trade, which exploded in the region and was linked to shadow networks that grew and were fostered during the war, has long been a source of concern for Riyadh. The issue remained at the top of the agenda after the fall; necessary were “measurable results” in production and smuggling sites, as well as control of border crossings, the desert, and the northern border of the Kingdom.
The consolidation of land and sea channels and a reduction in domestic seizures would be indicators of any accomplishment in this area. In the new Saudi-Syrian relations framework, fighting Captagon has become synonymous with the Kingdom’s national security. Saudi circles have connected any sources of cash for rehabilitation or more general economic openness to concrete security assistance.
Rebuilding the Economy & Politics Based on ‘Stability versus Opportunity’
Riyadh is aware that a legal and security vacuum cannot pique people’s interest in investing. As a result, it is moving cautiously in terms of investment, keeping an eye on interim laws, anti-corruption measures, the openness of contracts for energy, ports, and telecommunications, and even the future of Syria’s public debt.
Saudi Arabia has its own compass: accountable pledges, safe borders, and long-term stability. Only then would the Saudi private sector—banks, contracts, and logistics—be able to grow and capitalise on the enormous potential in housing, infrastructure, and services, as well as link markets through Mediterranean ports and land corridors. Therefore, redefining Saudi-Syrian relations as a platform for mutual benefits instead of merely a political slogan is underway.
Regional Dynamics: Ankara’s Calculations & the Effects of Appeasement with Iran
The Saudi-Syrian relations operate within a larger geopolitical context. Since 2023, the Gulf-Iranian de-escalation has reduced the intensity of polarisation and given the Arab world more room to act without having to engage directly with Tehran’s proxies.
However, given border security measures and a military presence in the north, Riyadh is waiting to see how Turkey will handle the Syrian issue, which affects not just refugees but also smuggling networks and trade interests.
The Kingdom is placing its bet on establishing a relationship that promotes the centralisation and unity of the Syrian state, as this alone can control the chaos that has been driving irregular migration and smuggling for years. The transitional governing institutions test their capacity to contain conflicting local forces.
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‘Arab Return’ or ‘Stability Capitalisation’: What Is Riyadh’s Current Situation?
The Saudi-Syrian relationship has undergone two distinct stages between 2023 and 2025: the first was bringing Syria back into the Arab fold by wagering on behavioural change, and the second was adjusting to an abrupt transformation that forced Damascus to face new realities.
Riyadh now seems to have a chance to make the most of its positive influence as the nation gets closer to the establishment of the first “post-Assad” parliament and more reputable transitional institutions. This includes promoting border security and fighting Captagon, advocating for an open economy that is subject to legal oversight, and using the Gulf financial network to fund initiatives that reduce social tension and generate employment.
Saudi-Syrian relations will become a regional success story if this combination works, balancing interests and ideals and proving that Arab capitals can manage the transition rather than just watch it. However, “normalisation” will be useless and security will once again take precedence over all other considerations if the process falters because of internal conflicts in Syria or the resurgence of war economic networks. Here, Riyadh will keep weighing its actions carefully, one step at a time, one outcome at a time.
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What did Saudi Arabia Give Syria Following the Late 2024 Political Upheavals?
Saudi Arabia has followed three parallel paths since late 2024: economic/institutional, service/operational, and humanitarian. With a total reported amount of $856,891,000 by the end of 2024, Riyadh has continued its aid supplies to Syria through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief).
Another $4.5 million in grants to the health sector in collaboration with the World Health Organisation followed in 2025. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia partnered with Qatar to provide an $89 million grant to Syria’s public sector, which would be distributed over three months.
In May 2024, direct flights for Syrian pilgrims to Jeddah were restored after over ten years, with an increase in flights during the next Hajj season. This resumption of flights also led to the revival of commercial flights between Damascus and Saudi cities, facilitating the Hajj pilgrimage and the operation of consular and humanitarian channels.
The reopening of the Saudi embassy in Damascus in 2024 and the appointment of the first ambassador since 2012 marked significant diplomatic progress. This includes partnerships through memoranda of understanding and agreements aimed at safeguarding investments, enhancing diplomatic training, and facilitating sectoral cooperation.
The two nations reached an agreement in August 2025 to protect and enhance investments, aligning with energy-related collaborations revealed by the Saudi Press Agency. In September 2025, they signed a memorandum of agreement for knowledge sharing and capacity development through their diplomatic institutions.
Further, economic signs of a coordinated investment strategy are evident through the announcement of an investment protection agreement, discussions on a financial and legal framework, and the activation of corporate delegations and investment forums between Damascus and Riyadh. These developments support a humanitarian approach by leveraging Saudi-Syrian relations to restore essential services and promote local employment and economic initiatives.
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Testing Will and Outcomes
Last but not least, this stage is unique because it applies the concept of “achievable contracts” to address the interrelated issues of politics, the economy, security, and refugees. There will be no more group selfies or protocol visits to assess Saudi-Syrian relations; instead, what transpires on the ground—will smuggling channels vanish?
Will the transition force the establishment of institutions that benefit all Syrians? Will the economy start to function under clear regulations that draw in capital rather than drive it away? In the days ahead, the answers to these queries will be made public.
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